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This paper deals with the effects to labour market institutions on labour market per-
formance. We analyse the employment threshold (the minimum growth rate necessary 
to keep employment constant) which is an indicator for the labour intensity of produc-
tion. We show for 17 OECD countries for the period 1971 to 2002 that the strictness of 
employment protection, the extent of wage bargaining co-ordination and the tax wedge 
reduce the labour intensity of production and raise the employment threshold. 
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1   Introduction 
 
Labour market institutions play a key role in explaining international differences in labour market 
performance. The most important labour market institutions considered in previous research are the 
unemployment benefit system, the system of wage determination (wage bargaining co-ordination, 
union density, collective bargaining coverage), labour taxes and employment protection.  
There are a great number of studies which explore the implications of institutions for the unem-
ployment  rate  (see  Nickell  1997,  Blanchard/Wolfers  2000,  Nickell/Layard  1999,  Berthold/Fehn 
2002, Nickell/Nunziata/Ochel 2005). Although the results are still somewhat mixed (OECD 2004), 
there seems to emerge a consensus that labour market institutions are an important determinant of 
unemployment. For instance, Nickell/Nunziata/Ochel (2005) report that shifts in labour market in-
stitutions explain a great part of movements in unemployment across OECD countries. Employment 
protection, labour taxes and the unemployment benefit system increases unemployment and espe-
cially unemployment persistence. 
 
The unemployment rate is only one among a greater list of indicators of labour market performance. 
In a study for 60 countries, Caballero et al. (2004) find that job security regulation reduces the 
speed of adjustment of employment to shocks and the growth rate of total factor productivity. The 
results in Gomez-Salvador, Messina and Vallanti (2004) show that the strictness of employment 
protection, the extent of wage bargaining co-ordination and the generosity of unemployment bene-
fits have a negative effect on job creation and the pace of job reallocation. Messina (2004) finds that 
more unionized and coordinated wage-setting structures as well as employment protection imply a 
lower employment share in the service industry. 
 
In the following we analyse the effects of labour market institutions on the labour intensity of pro-
duction. To be concrete, we use the concept of the employment threshold as the variable to be ex-
plained. The employment threshold represents the growth rate of production which is necessary for 
keeping employment constant. We show how this concept is related to the elasticities of labour de-
mand and to the development of input prices and how various labour market institutions may affect 
it. If a specific regulation increases the employment threshold, a country needs a higher growth rate 
in order to keep employment constant. This increases the likelihood of a weak employment per-
formance and of a higher unemployment rate. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we discuss the theoretical foundations of the concept 
of the employment threshold. In section 3 we present the empirical model for the estimation of the 
employment thresholds and the empirical analysis of the effects of different labour market institu-
tions. Section 4 summarises and draws some conclusions  
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2   Theoretical foundations 
 
2.1   Labour demand and the employment threshold 
 
In the following we assume that output  y  is produced by employing the input factors labour  L and 
capital  K . If firms minimize their production costs at given input prices and for a given level of 
output, there exists under weak assumptions with regard to production technology a dual cost func-
tion (see e.g. McFadden, 1976, or Chambers, 1988): 
(1)  ( ) , , , C C l q y T =  , 
where C  indicates the minimum costs of producing output  y  at the wage rate l and the user cost of 
capital  q. The variable  T  represents the state of technology. In order to be able to represent all 
economically relevant information of the underlying technology, the cost function must meet cer-
tain regularity conditions:  C  must be increasing in  q l,  and  y and has to be concave and linearly 
homogenous in land q. 
The demand for labour is derived via Shephard’s Lemma: 
(2)  ( ) , , ,
C






After totally differentiating equation (2) with respect to time and some manipulations we get the 
growth rate of labour input: 
(3)  T T L y y L q l l L L w w w w , , / , ε ε ε + + = , 
where  x w  denotes the growth rate of variable  x and  y L l L , , ,ε ε  and  T L, ε  are the elasticities of labour 
demand with respect to the wage rate, output and the state of technology, respectively. 
The employment threshold is defined as the growth rate of output which is necessary to keep em-
ployment constant. By setting  L w  in equation (3) equal to zero and solving for  y w , we get the em-
ployment threshold 
ET
y w : 
(4)  ( ) y L T T L q l l L
ET
y w w w , , / , / ε ε ε + − =  . 
Since  l L, ε  is negative, a higher growth rate of the relative wage (l/q) leads to an increase of the em-
ployment threshold. A higher pace of technical progress increases the employment threshold since 
T L, ε is typically negative in a cost minimising approach. 
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2.2   Effects of labour market institutions on the employment threshold 
As can be seen from equation (4), the effects of labour market institutions on labour demand and the 
employment threshold can work via different channels. The first channel concerns the effects on 
growth rates, the second channel on the elasticities. For example, tighter employment protection 
may deteriorate the flexibility of an economy and may thus lower the growth rate of total factor 
productivity (Caballero et al. 2004). This would decrease the employment threshold by reducing 
T w . But it should be kept in mind that  , L T T w ε  not only captures total factor productivity growth but 
also the effect of biased technical change. A higher wage rate induced by a higher employment pro-
tection of insiders may lead to a technology-driven reduction in labour demand (increasing the ab-
solute value of  T , L ε ) which increases the employment threshold. In addition, a tighter employment 
protection reduces probably the elasticity of labour demand with respect to output and therefore 
increases the employment threshold. For all these reasons we expect that a more stringent employ-
ment protection increases the employment threshold. Similar reasoning applies for other labour 
market institutions. 
 
3   Empirical results 
3.1   The employment threshold across countries and over time 
Since we do not have international comparable data for the user costs of capital, we do not estimate 
the  structural  labour  demand  equation  (3),  but  a  reduced  form  where  we  treat  the  sum  of 
q l l L w / , ε and  T T L w , ε  as an unobserved variable. Under this assumption we get the following estima-
tion equation: 
(5)    t t y t t t L u w w + + = , , 2 , 1 , β β  . 
The possibly time-varying parameters  t , 1 β  and  t , 2 β  are defined as  1, , / , t L l l q L T T w w β ε ε = +  and 
y L t , , 2 ε β = . The variable  t u  is a white noise error term. The employment threshold defined in 
equation (4) is now given by  the expression  t , 2 t , 1 β β − .  
For the specification of  1 β and  2 β  we choose a second order random walk: 
(6)    ( ) t i t i L , ,
2 1 ν β = −  
with  L as the lag operator. Second order random walks can accommodate complex time series 
properties of variables but nevertheless produce “smooth” curves. Preliminary tests showed that 
2 β varies between countries but is constant or almost constant over time within a country. In our   5 
final model for which we present the results below,  2 β  is therefore modelled as a constant parame-
ter. 
The model (equations (5) and (6)) is set in a state-space-form and is estimated by maximum likeli-
hood using the Kalman filter (for details on the Kalman filter see Harvey 1989). 
We estimate the model for 17 OECD countries (see table 1), using yearly data from 1971 to 2002. 
The dependent variable is the growth rate of labour input in the private sector. Labour input is 
measured as total hours worked. The explanatory variable is the growth rate of real value added in 
the private sector (Source for both variables: OECD, Economic Outlook). Production and employ-
ment in the public sector are not included. The data for Germany refer to West Germany until 1990 
and to unified Germany from 1991 onwards. In order to eliminate the “outlier” in the growth rates 
for 1991, we include a dummy variable, which takes the value one in 1991 and zero in all other 
years. 
In table 1, we present the average values of the estimated employment thresholds in the private sec-
tor in the 17 countries for different time periods. In most countries, the employment threshold de-
clined during the sample period. The (unweighted) mean of the employment thresholds was 3.9 % 
during the seventies, 2.4 % during the eighties and 1.5 % in the years after 1990. In Germany, Japan 
and the USA the employment thresholds increased by about 1 percentage point from the eighties to 
the nineties. It should be noted that, compared with the first two countries, the employment thresh-
old is still relatively low in the USA. It is remarkable that especially in the continental European 
countries the employment threshold is relatively high, compared with Australia, Canada, Sweden, 
the UK and the United States. A very special case is New Zealand: The employment threshold is in 
many years negative. During the nineties the labour volume would have increased even in a reces-
sion. 
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Table 1: Employment thresholds in OECD countries 
        |              Period 
 Country|   1971-1980  1981-1990  1991-2002 | 1971-2002 
--------+-----------------------------------+---------- 
    Aus |     0.014      0.012      0.011   |     0.012 
    Bel |     0.060      0.039      0.015   |     0.036 
    Can |     0.017      0.010      0.013   |     0.013 
    Dnk |     0.046      0.025      0.023   |     0.030 
    Fin |     0.042      0.038      0.033   |     0.037 
    Fra |     0.047      0.035      0.022   |     0.034 
    Ger |     0.054      0.016      0.024   |     0.031 
    Ire |     0.065      0.039      0.010   |     0.036 
    Ita |     0.066      0.022      0.013   |     0.033 
    Jpn |     0.040      0.021      0.033   |     0.032 
    Nld |     0.042      0.030      0.016   |     0.028 
    Nzl |    -0.014      0.016     -0.040   |    -0.014 
    Nor |     0.061      0.027      0.028   |     0.038 
    Esp |     0.047      0.030      0.012   |     0.028 
    Swe |     0.034      0.021      0.020   |     0.024 
    UK  |     0.034      0.023      0.016   |     0.024 
    Usa |     0.014      0.005      0.015   |     0.011 
--------+-----------------------------------+---------- 
  Total |     0.039      0.024      0.015   |     0.026 
 
3.2   The effects of labour market institutions on the employment threshold 
In this study we concentrate our interest on the effects of employment protection, labour taxes 
(measured by the tax wedge), union density and the degree of co-ordination in wage negotiations on 
the employment threshold.  
Every country in the world has established a complex system of laws and institutions (so-called 
“case law” and collective agreements) intended to protect the interests of workers. We use the Em-
ployment Protection Index (EP) from the Labour Market Institutions Database of Nickell and Nun-
ziata (2001). This series was built chaining OECD data (Employment Protection Legislation Index 
Version I) with data from Lazear (1990). For the recent years we use the information of Nickell 
(2003) and the OECD (2004) by linearly interpolating the missing years and connecting with the 
series of the just mentioned database. The variable in the range {0, 2} is increasing with the strict-
ness of employment protection. Table A1 in the Appendix shows the means of EP for different pe-
riods in the sample countries.   7 
The OECD indicator takes into account regulations concerning individual dismissals, collective 
dismissals and the temporary employment forms such as fixed-term employment and the supply of 
labour by temporary work agencies. Although the OECD has elaborated, with the country ranking, 
the most highly differentiated evaluation scheme made so far, there are still some restrictions with 
regard to the reliability of the indicators. For example, one difficult problem is the weighting of the 
evaluated aspects of regulation. Therefore, we compare EP with another index of employment regu-
lation, recently introduced by the World Bank (2005). The Rigidity of Employment Index  (REI) of 
the World Bank for the year 2004 is based on a detailed study of employment laws and regulations, 
as well as relevant constitutional provisions. This index takes into consideration information about 
hiring and firing of workers and the rigidity of working hours. In figure 1 we compare the World 
Bank index for the year 2004 with the OECD index (EPI) for the year 2003. Both institutions assess 
the regulations of the employment protection very similar in the different countries. The rank corre-
lation coefficient between the two variables is 0.79 and is highly significant . 
 












































We take the tax wedge (TW), union density (UDNET) and the co-ordination index (COW) from 
Nickell (2001, 2003). Table A2 in the Appendix contains the minima, maxima and the means of 
these variables. TW (in decimal notations) measures the total tax rate on labour and contains payroll 
taxes, income taxes and consumption taxes. UDNET is calculated as the percentage of employees 
who are union members. Another aspect of wage bargaining is the extent to which bargaining is co-
ordinated. COW is an index with range {-1,1} constructed as an interpolation of OECD data by   8 
Nickell. It is increasing in the degree of co-ordination in the bargaining process on the employers´ 
as well as on the unions´ side. 
Table 2 presents the results for the estimation period 1971 to 2000. The dependent variable is the 
estimated employment threshold. Explanatory variables are the employment protection index (EP), 
union density (UDNET), the tax wedge (TW), the wage bargaining co-ordination index COW and 
COW squared (COW2). The reason for including COW2 is that labour market performance may 
not be a monotonic but a U-shaped or hump-shaped function of the co-ordination index. (see, e.g., 
Calmfors/Driffill 1988).  
Model 1 and model 2 are estimated by OLS. The two models differ with respect to the modelling of 
time effects. Model 1 includes a linear time trend, model 2 includes time dummies for each year. 
Models 3 and 4 allow for country-specific variances of the error term and are estimated by GLS. 
 
Table 2: Basic model. 1971-2000 
     Note: Absolute t-values in parentheses 
 
In all specifications, the employment protection index exerts a highly significant positive effect on 
the employment threshold. An increase in the EP index by one point increases the employment 
threshold by 0.94 percentage points (Models 2 und 4 with time dummies). During the period 1992 
to 2002 Germany had on average an employment threshold of 2.4 %, whereas the actual output 
growth rate in the business sector during this period was only 1.7 %. If there were a regime with an 
employment protection comparable to the UK, the employment threshold would be only 1.5 %. The 
tax wedge TW and the degree of co-ordination COW increase the employment threshold. COW 
squared is insignificant. This implies that co-ordination has a monotonically increasing effect on the 
threshold. If in Germany there were a regime with a degree of co-ordination comparable to the UK, 
the employment threshold would be lower by half a percentage point. The effect of union density 
UDNET is always insignificant. 
 







 0.0074     (3.4) 
-0.0051    (1.2) 
 0.0198     (2.6) 
 0.0050     (3.1) 
 0.0005     (0.3) 
-0.0011   (12.7) 
 0.0094       (4.5) 
-0.0007       (0.2) 
 0.0146       (2.0) 
 0.0036       (2.3) 
 0.0001       (0.1) 
time dummies 
 0.0064       (5.2) 
-0.0012      (0.6) 
 0.0221       (6.0) 
 0.0030       (3.3) 
-0.0012      (1.1) 
-0.0012     (26.6) 
 0.0094       (6.4) 
 0.0026       (1.1) 
 0.0117       (2.5) 
 0.0022       (2.1) 
-0.0018      (1.5) 
time dummies   9 
The reason for the insignificance of UDNET may be that not union density per se but the coverage 
of workers by collective bargaining provisions is the more important factor. In some countries there 
are extremely large differences between these two variables. For example, in France the union den-
sity was about 10 percent in the last decade, but the coverage by collective bargaining provisions is 
assessed to be about 90 percent. In sectoral bargaining systems employer behaviour combined with 
administrative governance of collective contracts may be more important for the coverage rates than 
union membership (OECD, 2004). In the following we estimate an extended model containing addi-
tionally an indicator of collective bargaining coverage. We use the Collective Bargaining Coverage 
Index (CBC), which stems from the OECD (2004). Unfortunately, we do have information on CBC 
only for the years 1980, 1990 and 2000. Therefore, we neglect the data for the seventies and inter-
polate CBC for the remaining years. Consequently, we have only 307 observations instead of 476 in 
the basic model.  
 
Table 3 presents the results when we add CBC to the explanatory variables.  
 
Table 3: Extended model (with CBC), 1980-2000 
 








 0.0064       (2.6) 
-0.0010       (0.3) 
 0.0164       (2.0) 
 0.0033       (2.1) 
 0.0012       (0.5) 
 0.0000       (0.0) 
-0.0003       (2.6) 
 0.0064      (2.5) 
-0.0008     (0.2) 
 0.0152      (1.8) 
 0.0030      (1.9) 
 0.0008      (0.4) 
 0.0000      (0.1) 
time dummies 
 0.0065      (3.9) 
-0.0009      (0.4) 
 0.0169       (2.6) 
 0.0023       (2.1) 
-0.0031      (2.1) 
-0.0000      (0.7) 
-0.0003      (3.8) 
 0.0068      (3.8) 
-0.0009      (0.3) 
 0.0173      (2.5) 
 0.0020      (1.7) 
-0.0027     (1.7) 
-0.0000     (0.9) 
time dummies 
  Note: Absolute t-values in parentheses 
 
It seems that the indicator for collective bargaining coverage has no effect on the employment 
threshold. The most important institutional factors for explaining the development of the employ-
ment threshold in the different countries over time are employment protection, the tax wedge and 
the wage bargaining co-ordination. 
 
4   Summary and Conclusions 
The employment threshold seems to be a useful concept for analysing the effects of factor prices 
(see Flaig/Rottmann 2001) and labour market institutions on employment. In this paper we have 
shown that the employment threshold is not only a possibly time-varying parameter but also de-
pends on labour market institutions. A more restrictive employment protection, a higher tax wedge   10 
and a higher extent of wage bargaining co-ordination all lead to a less labour-intensive production 
and require a higher growth rate of output in order to keep employment constant. The economic 
reasons for these effects are the induced pressure on wages and higher direct costs of using labour 
instead of capital and other factors as production inputs. 
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Table A1: Means of EP 
 
           |            Periods 
   Country |    1971-80    1981-90  1991-2002|     Total 
-----------+---------------------------------+---------- 
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       Can |      0.39       0.39       0.39 |      0.39 
       Dnk |      1.20       1.18       0.83 |      1.06 
       Fin |      1.20       1.19       1.04 |      1.14 
       Fra |      1.13       1.31       1.43 |      1.30 
       Ger |      1.60       1.63       1.36 |      1.52 
       Ire |      0.40       0.50       0.53 |      0.48 
       Ita |      1.72       1.71       1.38 |      1.60 
       Jpn |      1.17       1.17       1.15 |      1.16 
       Nld |      1.35       1.34       1.18 |      1.28 
       Nzl |      0.88       0.88       0.98 |      0.92 
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       Swe |      1.22       1.76       1.26 |      1.40 
       UK  |      0.38       0.42       0.43 |      0.41 
       Usa |      0.10       0.10       0.10 |      0.10 
-----------+---------------------------------+---------- 
     Total |      1.08       1.12       0.98 |      1.06 
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable     |       min      mean       max 
-------------+------------------------------ 
      EP     |      0.10      1.06      2.00 
     Udnet   |      0.09      0.43      0.91 
      TW     |      0.24      0.50      0.83 
     Cow     |     -1.00      0.10      1.00 
     CBC     |     14.00     65.21     90.00 
--------------------------------------------    
  Ifo Working Papers 
 
No.  14  Hülsewig, O., E. Mayer and T. Wollmershäuser, Bank Loan Supply and Monetary 
Transmission in Germany: An Assessment Based on Matching Impulse Responses, Au-
gust 2005. 
 
No. 13  Abberger, K., The Use of Qualitative Business Tendency Surveys for Forecasting Busi-
ness Investing in Germany, June 2005. 
 
No. 12  Thum, M. Korruption und Schattenwirtschaft, Juni 2005. 
 
No. 11  Abberger, K., Qualitative Business Surveys and the Assessment of Employment – A 
Case Study for Germany, June 2005. 
 
No. 10  Berlemann, M. and F. Nelson, Forecasting Inflation via Experimental Stock Markets: 
Some Results from Pilot Markets, June 2005. 
 
No. 9  Henzel, S. and T. Wollmershäuser, An Alternative to the Carlson-Parkin Method for the 
Quantification of Qualitative Inflation Expectations: Evidence from the Ifo World Eco-
nomic Survey, June 2005. 
 
No. 8  Fuchs, Th. and L. Wößmann, Computers and Student Learning: Bivariate and Multivari-
ate Evidence on the Availability and Use of Computers at Home and at School, May 
2005. 
 
No. 7  Werding, M., Survivor Benefits and the Gender Tax-Gap in Public Pension Schemes – 
Work Incentives and Options for Reform, May 2005. 
 
No. 6  Holzner, Chr., Search Frictions, Credit Constraints and Firm Financed General Training, 
May 2005. 
 
No. 5  Sülzle, K., Duopolistic Competition between Independent and Collaborative Business-to-
Business Marketplaces, March 2005. 
 
No. 4  Becker, Sascha O., K. Ekholm, R. Jäckle and M.-A. Muendler, Location Choice and Em-
ployment Decisions: A Comparison of German and Swedish Multinationals, March 2005. 
    
No. 3  Bandholz, H., New Composite Leading Indicators for Hungary and Poland, March 2005. 
 
No. 2  Eggert, W. and M. Kolmar, Contests with Size Effects, January 2005. 
 
No. 1  Hanushek, E. and L. Wößmann, Does Educational Tracking Affect Performance and Ine-
quality? Differences-in-Differences Evidence across Countries, January 2005. 
 